OTHER WAYS SMART OFFICIALS
HAVE KEPT THE DREAM ALIVE
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IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED
TRY, TRY AGAIN
After the SMART ballot funding failures of 1990 and 1998, in 2006 SMART officials decided to attract voters with the prospect of modern, sleek “bullet looking” trains to be supplied by the Colorado Railcar Manufacturing Company (CRM). Unfortunately for SMART, the 2006 ballot measure also failed to garner enough votes to pass. Finally, on November 4, 2008, with the strong support of special interest groups that were lured in by promises of beautiful and safe bike trails, weekend service, Cloverdale to Larkspur service, control over future freight train traffic and other non-binding promises, the tax measure to fund SMART finally passed.
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SMART PROJECT PLAN BASED ON
MANUFACTURER THAT GOES OUT OF BUSINESS
Prior to the November 4, 2008 election, SMART officials were fully aware that Colorado Railcar Manufacturing Company (CRM), the only manufacturer of the required FRA crashworthy compliant DMU rail vehicles that the entire SMART project was based on, was financially insolvent and unable to supply SMART’s needs. On December 23, 2008 CRM officially closed their doors, thus allowing SMART officials the opportunity to argue that they didn’t defraud the public by omitting this vital information to voters, because CRM was still technically “in business” on November 4, 2008. During a January 6, 2009 interview with the Press Democrat, Chris Coursey, spokesman for the Sonoma Marin Area Rail Transit district revealed, “This doesn’t come as a surprise, we have known they have been having problems for a while,” “We were aware they had serious financial problems.” However, it was well known to the officials at TRI-MET, Portland's WES Commuter Line, and virtually all commuter rail professionals throughout the U.S. that CRM was in serious financial trouble as early as 2005.
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A TRI-MET AND SMART EXECUTIVE KNEW IT ALL
Lillian Hames current SMART General Manager and former TRI-MET Railway Development Manager knew all about the TRI-MET/CRM debacle, as did most commuter rail planning professionals. The commuter rail community is so small and tight that SMART's 2009 RFP for rail vehicles required bidders to allow SMART to assign all or part of their purchasing rights to TRI-MET.
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THE LIGHT RAIL FIASCO
Also in the January 6, 2009 Press Democrat interview, Coursey stated “The closure (Colorado Railcar) may have little effect on SMART, which can choose to run lighter, European-style, diesel-powered railcars instead.” I'll give Mr. Coursey the benefit of the doubt and just say that to make such a misleading statement in such a glib manner reveals his total ignorance on the subject. However, Mr. Coursey's misrepresentation that SMART can just "choose" to go with "light rail" does fit nicely with SMART's pre November 2008 attempts to make the public believe that there was a possibility of sidestepping FRA Safety regulations with a less than crashworthy vehicle that was readily available from a number of suppliers. Even their EIR and a special "Whitepaper", contained such misleading statements. In July 2009, SMART finally decided to go with an FRA safety compliant "heavy rail" vehicle
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SMART HAS NEVER REVEALED THEIR,
POTENTIALLY, MOST EXPENSIVE CAPITAL COST
With a move that artificially reduced the cost of the overall project, SMART's April 2010 RFP for vehicles explicitly called for the exclusion of Positive Train Controls. Positive Train Control (PTC) systems employ trackway sensors that control train movements by providing powered rail vehicles with automatic braking systems that are controlled with safety, security, precision, and efficiency. PTC systems improve railroad safety by significantly reducing the probability of collisions between trains, casualties to roadway workers and damage to their equipment, and over speed accidents. PTC became a Federal mandate after the September 2008 crash between a LA Metrolink passenger train and a Union Pacific freight train. Although the PTC mandate became law prior to the November 4, 2008 vote which funded SMART, SMART has never announced their estimated cost of PTC to the public. Caltrain estimates their cost to implement PTC along their 77 mile route will be $231M. SMART’s route is 70 miles long.
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